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Studies that distinguish among believed memories, believed-not-remembered events (e.g.,
family stories), and nonbelieved memories (i.e., memories no longer believed to have
occurred) typically rely on experimenter provided or overtly elicited events. These meth-
ods may mis-estimate the frequency and nature of such events in everyday memory. Three
studies examined whether such events would be elicited via indirect cueing. Participants
recalled and rated events on autobiographical belief, recollection, and other characteristics
associated with remembering. All three event types resulted, but with a low rate of nonbe-
lieved memories. Believed and nonbelieved memories received similar perceptual and re-
experiencing ratings, and both exceeded believed-not-remembered events. Lifespan cueing
found nonbelieved memories to be most frequent in middle childhood (ages 6–11). Cueing
for ‘‘events’’ vs. ‘‘memories’’ revealed that ‘‘memory’’ cues lead to retrieval of a more homo-
geneous set of events and differences when predicting autobiographical belief and recollec-
tion. These studies support the distinction between autobiographical belief and
recollection for autobiographical events.
 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
Discussions of autobiographical memory frequently emphasize the recollective aspects of remembering. For example,
autobiographical memory is frequently studied by asking (or cueing) people to provide ‘memories’. Research has identiﬁed
features of memories that are consistently elicited in response to such queries. Autobiographical events tend to be labeled as
memories when event representations are accompanied by vivid mental simulation (perceptual vividness, spatial–temporal
details) and a sense of re-experiencing the past (Addis, Pan, Vu, Laiser, & Schacter, 2009). In other terms, recollection is a
metacognitive appraisal that is made at the time of remembering (Johnson, Raye, Mitchell, & Ankudowich, 2011; Rubin,
2006). Because researchers typically ask for memories, it is perhaps not surprising that participants tend to report vivid epi-
sodic events.
But recollection is not the only metacognitive appraisal present when remembering the past. A variety of other appraisals
are also made of autobiographical events. For example: Does the event have particular signiﬁcance to one’s life story? How
recently or how frequently has this event been recalled? How accurate are the various details within the event in represent-
ing the prior experience? One central non-recollective judgment that is typically present when vivid autobiographical mem-
ories are recalled is the belief that the event genuinely occurred in the past. This is termed autobiographical belief (or belief in
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(Mazzoni, Scoboria, & Harvey, 2010; Scoboria, Mazzoni, Kirsch, & Relyea, 2004).
In the current studies, we examined the methods that are used to elicit autobiographical event representations, and the
conclusions that are made about the types of event representations that result. This topic is timely because recent research
has shown that recollection and autobiographical belief are substantially independent. In the laboratory, researchers have
reliably produced memories for which autobiographical belief exceeds the degree of recollection for the event (i.e., be-
lieved-not-remembered events; Hart & Schooler, 2006; Mazzoni, Loftus, Seitz, & Lynn, 1999; Scoboria, Lynn, Hessen, & Fisico,
2007). Such events also occur frequently outside the laboratory. A parent may describe an event for which their child has
little recollection, but which he/she comes to believe occurred. Such memories are not infrequent; for example, when rating
childhood events, autobiographical belief ratings exceed recollection ratings in nearly half of cases (Scoboria et al., 2004).
Confabulatory delusions in some individuals with schizophrenia can also reﬂect instances where autobiographical belief
is high even when recollection is low (Baddeley, Thornton, Chua, & McKenna, 1995). There are also naturally occurring in-
stances in which vivid recollection exists without belief that the event occurred, which are termed ‘‘nonbelieved memories’’
(Mazzoni et al., 2010). In this case the person has a ‘memory’ for the event – participants rate recollective features as being as
strong as other believed memories. At the same time, they report lacking belief that the event represents a true occurrence
from their past.
Recent work has drawn on believed-not-remembered events and nonbelieved memories to document a strong and reli-
able distinction in simple factor structure of the recollection and autobiographical belief constructs, and demonstrated a
double dissociation in the predictors of each (Scoboria et al., in press). This work shows that characteristics of the memory
image (e.g., perceptual features and the sense of re-experiencing) predict recollection but not autobiographical belief,
whereas event plausibility strongly predicts autobiographical belief but weakly predicts recollection. This work shows that
by focussing on believed memories in autobiographical memory research, we cannot effectively demonstrate the distinction
between autobiographical belief and recollection. This is because both are strongly present for such events, leading to an
artiﬁcial appearance of high correspondence. Furthermore, with this bias toward speciﬁc types of autobiographical event
representations, the true population and availability of other distinct types of event representations are likely
underestimated.
In order to expand upon the range of event representations examined, some studies have queried speciﬁc classes of mem-
ories or sought to contrast different types of representations. In addition to the word-cue technique, Galton also devised the
‘‘breakfast technique’’ which asked participants to recall the appearance of that morning’s breakfast table, ‘‘directing subjects
to particular episodes in their lives’’ (Brewer, 1986, p. 36). In the false memory literature, researchers typically suggest the
same false childhood or false laboratory-based events to participants within studies (Hessen-Kayﬁtz & Scoboria, 2012; Ost,
2013). Other studies have further demonstrated via this approach that nonbelieved memories can be created in the lab
(Clark, Nash, Fincham, & Mazzoni, 2012; Otgaar, Scoboria, & Smeets, 2013). Investigators have also drawn participants’ atten-
tion to metacognitive judgments about events and/or the phenomenological properties of the memories compared to non-
memorial representations. Johnson, Foley, Suengas, and Raye (1988) asked participants to contrast believed autobiographical
memories with newly imagined events (see also Arbuthnott, Geelen, & Kealy, 2002; Kealy, Kuiper, & Klein, 2006). Crawley
and Eacott (2006) asked individuals to retrieve and rate personal memories in contrast to recall of events that occurred to
other people. Speciﬁc to the distinction between autobiographical belief and recollection, Mazzoni et al. (2010) used an event
contrast approach when asking their participants to select and rate age-matched nonbelieved memories, believed memories,
and believed-not-remembered events.
There are potential problems associated with directly asking participants to recall events with speciﬁc mnemonic char-
acteristics or metacognitive features. Doing so draws attention to properties that may otherwise not be salient to partici-
pants when remembering events. The event comparison approach assumes independence of the categories, but
awareness of the categories of interest may bias individuals to compare the events when making ratings, whereas ratings
may have varied to a different degree if events were elicited in isolation and if participants were not aware of the features
in which the researcher is interested. Most troubling, directly querying categories may produce experimental demands to
produce particular types of event descriptions, even if representations of the type(s) requested do not occur outside of
the laboratory. The false memory approach, and by extension the studies of nonbelieved memories that build upon it, also
have the potential limitations that the events used are selected by researchers, are therefore likely less personally signiﬁcant
than genuine events, and the event representations are recently constructed.
What such studies cannot achieve is an understanding of the nature and frequency of nonbelieved memories and be-
lieved-not-remembered events as they exist in everyday autobiographical memory. What is needed is a method which
encourages the reporting of different types of autobiographical event representations, but without asking for the categories
directly (thereby avoiding biases in event selection). Such an approach should sample various types of representations and
examine autobiographical events that are personally relevant.
One goal of the current research was to develop methods to indirectly cue events by which greater variability in autobio-
graphical belief and recollection ratings could emerge. Without artiﬁcially drawing participants’ attention to these con-
structs, we hoped to elicit believed memories, believed-not-remembered events, and nonbelieved memories.
Furthermore, should such events be elicited, we planned to examine the phenomenology associated with each, the relation-
ship between belief in occurrence and recollection for each, and how cueing techniques inﬂuence this relationship. We
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from indirect cueing should coincide with previous ﬁndings.
Across three studies, we cued participants to recall multiple events from their personal past. After this event generation
phase, participants rated these events in random order on autobiographical belief, recollection, and related event character-
istics. This permitted exploration of the information people use to make autobiographical belief and recollection judgments.
In the process, we evaluated the implications of a ‘believed memory bias’ when cueing for ‘‘memories.’’
The ﬁrst study cued multiple childhood events and sought to elicit these distinct types of event representations. We de-
ﬁned and contrasted nonbelieved memories, believed memories, and believed-not-remembered events, anticipating that
nonbelieved memories and believed memories would show similar perceptual, spatial, re-experiencing ratings, and both
would exceed ratings for believed-not-remembered events, consistent with Mazzoni et al. (2010) and Clark et al. (2012).
We also anticipated that the nonbelieved memories would be dissimilar to believed memories, such as being more suscep-
tible to persuasion by other people that the event did not occur.
To situate the current research for readers who are familiar with other uses of the term ‘belief’ in the autobiographical
memory literature, we also note an important distinction between the concept of ‘autobiographical belief’ (studied here)
and that of ‘belief in recollection’ (not studied here). Autobiographical belief is the judgment that an event genuinely oc-
curred in the past. An example of an item is, ‘‘How likely is it that you personally did in fact experience this event?’’ ‘Belief
in recollection’ is the construct emphasized by Rubin (2006), and is the judgment that what is remembered accurately re-
ﬂects past occurrence. An example of an item is, ‘‘I believe the event really occurred in the way I’m thinking about it and
that I have not imagined or fabricated anything that did not occur.’’ See the discussion below and Scoboria et al. (in press)
for more on this issue.
2. Study 1: Cueing multiple childhood events
2.1. Method
In order to maximize our chances of eliciting nonbelieved memories and believed-not-remembered events in addition to
believed memories, we asked all participants to recall events from before the age of 6 years old. Naïve beliefs about child-
hood memory (Magnussen et al., 2006) as well as empirical data about the shift from known to remembered events (Bruce,
Dolan, & Phillips-Grant, 2000) suggested that believed-not-remembered events might be more prevalent from this age range.
Prior work also shows a roughly equal split between believed memories and believed-not-remembered events in this age
range (Scoboria et al., 2004).
2.1.1. Participants
A total of 171 undergraduate students from both Lafayette College and the University of Windsor1 participated for partial
course credit (80.1% female; Mage = 21.30, SD = 4.32, range 18–47). All procedures for this and all subsequent studies described
were reviewed by the Institutional Review Board at Lafayette College and the Research Ethics Board at the University of
Windsor.
2.1.2. Procedure
The 30-min study took place in a computer lab with up to 10 individuals per session, using Direct RT v2008 software (Jar-
vis, 2008). Participants were cued to recall ﬁve events from age 6 or younger; the exact language of the instruction is pro-
vided in Appendix A. Participants provided demographic information. They were next asked to recall the ﬁrst event that
came to mind from before age six, and to provide a brief three to four word description of the event. This prompt to recall
an event from ‘‘before 1st grade (before  age 6)’’ was repeated to cue a total of ﬁve events. Participants were then presented
with the brief descriptions that they had previously provided in a random order and rated each in turn on belief in occur-
rence (two items), recollection (three items), plausibility, and 15 memory characteristic items (see Appendix B for the exact
items).
The belief in occurrence and recollection items were taken from Scoboria et al. (in press, Study 1), who reported high scale
reliability and evidence of construct validity. The primary belief and recollection items were rated on 1–8 point scales, and
the remaining one belief and two recollection items were rated on 1–7 point scales. The memory characteristic items par-
alleled items used in preceding work on the characteristics associated with autobiographical remembering (Johnson et al.,
1988; Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003). The items were rated on 7-point scales and included: perceptual detail, spatial
detail, two re-experiencing items (reliving, mental time travel), speciﬁcity, the degree to which one could be persuaded that
an event happened differently than recalled, event signiﬁcance, two rehearsal items (prior talk and prior thought), and three
emotion items (current positive emotions, negative emotions, and emotional intensity). Due to the previously established
relationship between plausibility and autobiographical belief, general and personal plausibility items were also included
(Scoboria, Mazzoni, Jarry, & Shapero, 2012; Scoboria et al., in press).1 The results for all studies were invariant across the institutions.
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the three recollection items were averaged (a = .89). Reliving and mental time travel were averaged to create an index of re-
experiencing (a = .90), and talked and thought were averaged to create an index of rehearsal (a = .81). Conﬁdence intervals
for descriptive statistics were calculated by bootstrapping 1000 samples with replacement. We note that we examined the
order with which the events were elicited, and found no notable patterns.
2.2. Study 1 results
First, we operationalized the event representation categories based on autobiographical belief and recollection scores.
Based on Scoboria et al. (in press) who reported that recollection exceeded belief by 1.4 scale points on average for self-iden-
tiﬁed nonbelieved memories, nonbelieved memories here were deﬁned as any event for which the respondent rated the rec-
ollection item one or more points higher than the belief item. Believed-not-remembered events were deﬁned as events for
which the respondent rated belief one or more points higher than recollection, and believed memories were deﬁned as in-
stances in which the ratings were equal. However, instances in which both ratings were within one point of the upper end of
the scales were coded as believed memories, as both phenomena are strong in this case (i.e., if recollection was rated as 8 and
belief as 7, or the reverse). Based on this deﬁnition, 3.0% (n = 26) of events were classiﬁed as nonbelieved memories, 58.6%
(n = 501) as believed memories, and 38.3% (n = 328) as believed-not-remembered events. Descriptive statistics for autobio-
graphical belief and recollection by subtype of representation are provided in Table 1.
The next analyses contrasted the remaining memory characteristic items across these three subtypes (Table 2). The com-
parisons involved one-way ANOVAs followed by pair-wise comparisons with a conservative p-value of .001 to address alpha
inﬂation and non-independence of observations (per the recommendations by Stevens, 2009). We also report 95% conﬁdence
intervals of means and Cohen’s d values, and base our interpretation in part on overlap of these intervals (see Cummings,
2011). Nonbelieved and believed memories did not differ, and both exceeded believed-not-remembered events for percep-
tual details and re-experiencing at the time of rating. The spatial, signiﬁcance, rehearsal, and emotion intensity items were
also in the same direction. Nonbelieved memories were rated as less personally plausible, less speciﬁc, and more susceptible
to persuasion than believed memories. Believed memories signiﬁcantly differed from believed-not-remembered events for
the majority of the remaining items. The types of representation did not differ on current negative emotion, or general plau-
sibility. The pattern of ratings for any of the items did not vary signiﬁcantly across the order in which the ﬁve events were
cued.
2.3. Study 1 discussion
The three subtypes of autobiographical event representations were observed using an indirect cueing procedure. The
characteristics associated with recollection were consistent with a sub-set of the phenomenological items reported in Mazz-
oni et al. (2010) and Clark et al. (2012). Nonbelieved memories and believed memories showed similar ratings for perceptual
detail and re-experiencing, which exceeded ratings for believed-not-remembered events. The events classiﬁed as nonbe-
lieved memories were also associated with features that indicated some doubt as to the occurrence of the event: lower per-
sonal plausibility, lower event speciﬁcity, and higher ratings of susceptibility to persuasion that the event occurred
differently than recalled.
By focusing on early childhood events, we elicited a large number of believed-not-remembered events. Other studies in
which participants rated experimenter-provided events on autobiographical belief and recollection have reported that the
frequency with which memory ratings exceeded belief ratings ranges from 1.6% to 5.6% (Scoboria et al., 2004, 2007; Sharman
& Scoboria, 2009). We found a rate of 3% for nonbelieved memories, a rate similar to those studies but notably lower than the
20% reported by Mazzoni et al. (2010). Unlike Mazzoni et al. (2010), we did not screen for participants with memories of thisTable 1
Average belief and memory ratings by autobiographical representation classiﬁcation and study.
n Belief Memory Difference
M SD M SD M SD
Study 1 Nonbelieved memory 26 4.96 1.18 6.38 1.20 1.42 0.58
Believed memory 501 7.69 0.71 7.36 0.87 0.32 0.49
Believed not remembered event 328 7.77 0.61 4.42 1.57 3.36 1.49
Study 2 Nonbelieved memory 21 4.43 1.66 6.38 1.28 1.95 1.80
Believed memory 364 7.70 0.70 7.50 0.73 0.20 0.47
Believed not remembered event 163 7.52 0.89 4.87 1.40 2.64 1.25
Study 3 Nonbelieved memory 42 4.83 1.29 6.43 0.99 1.60 0.80
Believed memory 618 7.71 0.86 7.42 0.88 0.29 0.48
Believed not remembered event 520 7.53 0.83 4.70 1.44 2.83 1.50
Note: Nonbelieved memories were deﬁned as instances in which respondents chose to rate memory one or more points higher than belief, excepting when
memory was at the scale ceiling. Believed-not-remembered events were deﬁned as instances in which respondents chose rate belief higher than memory,
excepting when belief was at the scale ceiling.
Table 2
Study 1, memory characteristic ratings by autobiographical event representation.
Item Non-bel mem
n = 21
Bel mem
n = 364
Bel not rem
n = 163
Cohen’s d [95% CI]
(a) (b) (c) p < .001 (a) vs. (b) (b) vs. (c) (a) vs. (c)
Perceptual detail M 5.01
[4.28,5.62]
5.19
[5.06,5.33]
3.34
[3.19,3.48]
a,b > c 0.12
[.01, .25]
1.28
[1.18,1.38]
1.20
[1.05,1.34]
SD 1.55 1.49 1.39
Re-experiencing M 4.58
[4.03,5.11]
4.86
[4.72,5.01]
2.98
[2.82,3.12]
a,b > c 0.17
[.04, .31]
1.21
[1.10,1.32]
1.13
[.98,1.28]
SD 1.25 1.63 1.43
Spatial detail M 5.28
[4.56,6.00]
6.01
[5.89,6.12]
4.69
[4.50,4.87]
b > c 0.56
[.45, .67]
0.89
[.79, .99]
0.34
[.16, .52]
SD 1.63 1.28 1.74
Speciﬁcity M 4.92
[4.41,5.41]
5.78
[5.64,5.93]
4.92
[4.71,5.11]
a,c < b 0.55
[.42, .68]
0.51
[.39, .62]
0.00
[.19, .19]
SD 1.31 1.58 1.87
Susceptibility to persuasion M 4.76
[4.35,5.18]
3.29
[3.12,3.45]
4.21
[4.01,4.39]
a,c > b 0.81
[.66, .97]
0.51
[.39, .64]
0.28
[.07, .48]
SD 1.09 1.84 1.71
Signiﬁcance M 3.92
[3.29,4.57]
3.83
[3.65,4.01]
3.17
[2.98,3.37]
b > c 0.04
[.12, .22]
0.35
[.22, .48]
0.44
[.25, .61]
SD 1.57 2.00 1.75
Rehearsal M 3.52
[2.97,4.14]
3.61
[3.45,3,75]
3.00
[2.85,3.16]
b > c 0.06
[.08, .19]
0.40
[.29, .50]
0.36
[.21, .51]
SD 1.47 1.60 1.43
Positive emotion M 3.48
[2.78,4.23]
3.63
[3.45,3.82]
3.42
[3.19,3.64]
0.07
[.12, .26]
0.10
[.05, .24]
0.03
[.18, .24]
SD 1.70 2.19 2.07
Negative emotion M 2.84
[2.15,3.68]
2.34
[2.17,2.51]
2.02
[1.83,2,23]
0.26
[.10, .43]
0.17
[.05, .30]
0.47
[.29, .65]
SD 1.95 1.90 1.77
Emotion intensity M 3.04
[2.45,3.62]
2.95
[2.77,3.12]
2.54
[2.35,2.73]
b > c 0.05
[.10, .20]
0.23
[.11, .35]
0.30
[.13, .48]
SD 1.47 1.83 1.67
General plausibility M 5.76
[5.16,6.43]
5.84
[5.65,6.03]
6.09
[5.84,6.32]
0.04
[.15, .22]
0.11
[.04, .26]
0.15
[.08, .38]
SD 1.54 2.23 2.22
Personal plausibility M 5.84
[5.17,6.50]
7.46
[7.36,7.54]
7.50
[7.38,7.61]
a < b,c 1.47
[1.38,1.57]
0.04
[.04, .11]
1.50
[1.38,1.61]
SD 1.48 1.08 1.08
Note: Non-bel mem – nonbelieved memory; Bel mem – believed memory; Bel not rem – believed not remembered event. 95% conﬁdence intervals are in
brackets.
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have salient nonbelieved memories, their accessibility rate is lower. We wanted to see if we could increase the number of
spontaneously-generated nonbelieved memories. Given that Mazzoni et al. (2010) found the greatest number of nonbelieved
memories to be reported from middle childhood, we expanded our focus to potentially better sample each subtype of auto-
biographical episode.
3. Study 2: Events from across the young adult life-span
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
Undergraduate students from Lafayette College and the University of Windsor (N = 110, 80.0% female, aged 18+2) partic-
ipated for partial course credit.
3.1.2. Procedure
The procedure was identical to Study 1, with one exception: rather than cueing early events, participants were cued in a
random order to recall one event from ﬁve different life periods. The periods were: before age 6, ages 6–11, ages 12–14, ages
15–18, and after age 18. They then rated the events in random order using the same items as in Study 1. Reliability coefﬁ-
cients for belief in occurrence (a = .76), recollection (a = .83), re-experiencing (a = .87), and rehearsal (a = .84) were all high.2 Due to a programming error, age was not collected.
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The pattern of episode types across ages differed signiﬁcantly, v2(8) = 76.40, p < .001, /c = .37 (Fig. 1). Similar to Study 1,
nonbelieved memories were a minority (c.f. Table 1). The novel ﬁnding in Study 2 was that the proportion of nonbelieved
memories was highest in the 6–11 group (6.4%), and lower in the other age groups (3.3%); this difference approached
statistical signiﬁcance, v2(1) = 3.24, p = .072. As expected from prior work, the proportion of believed-not-remembered
events was highest prior to age 6, and decreased across the age ranges. The proportion of believed memories followed
the opposite pattern, and was highest in the most recent age range.
The analyses of the memory characteristics and plausibility ratings was conducted in the same manner as in Study 1
(Table 3). Nonbelieved and believed memories did not differ, and both exceeded believed-not-remembered events, for
perceptual details and re-experiencing. Spatial detail was also in the same direction. Compared to believed memories,
nonbelieved memories were rated signiﬁcantly lower in personal plausibility and event speciﬁcity, and the susceptibility
to persuasion item was in the same direction. For the remaining items, believed memories exceeded believed-not-remembered
events, while nonbelieved memories did not differ from either, excepting general plausibility which did not differ among
episodes.
3.3. Discussion
The rate of nonbelieved memories was highest in the 6–11 range, which is consistent with the age of nonbelieved
memories in Mazzoni et al. (2010). However, their rate of 20% continues to stand in contrast with the 6.4% obtained
here. Perceptual detail and re-experiencing were once again associated with memories, whether believed or not be-
lieved, while personal plausibility and event speciﬁcity were associated with lower conviction in nonbelieved
memories.
To further explore the implications of the Study 1 ﬁndings, we next manipulated the cue instructions. Prior studies have
differed in whether participants are asked to recall ‘‘events’’ or ‘‘memories.’’ We questioned whether this matters for the phe-
nomenological and metacognitive characteristics of what is recalled. Cueing ‘‘memories’’ may result in the retrieval of more
believed memories with higher recollection ratings, whereas cueing ‘‘events’’ should result in the retrieval of fewer believed
memories, lower phenomenal characteristics, and greater variability in ratings. If so, the relationships amongst characteris-
tics should differ in that there should be greater interrelation among items for believed memories (i.e., those generated in
response to ‘‘memory’’ cues) than for the other autobiographical episode subtypes (i.e., those generated in response to
‘‘event’’ cues). If these differences are found, it would suggest that cues which emphasize ‘‘memory’’ are biased toward elic-
iting a homogenous range of autobiographical event representations and are therefore artiﬁcially restricting the phenomena
in their full complexity.Fig. 1. Study 2, proportion of nonbelieved memories (where recollection ratings exceeded belief ratings), believed memories (where belief and recollection
ratings were equal) and believed-not-remembered events (where belief ratings exceeded recollection ratings) generated in response to each age-related
cue. See the text for exact method of categorizing autobiographical event representations.
Table 3
Study 2, memory characteristic ratings by autobiographical representation across events.
Item Non-bel mem
n = 21
Bel mem
n = 364
Bel not rem
n = 163
Cohen’s d [95% CI]
(a) (b) (c) p < .001 (a) vs. (b) (b) vs. (c) (a) vs. (c)
Perceptual detail M 4.87
[4.20,5.55]
5.37
[5.22,5.53]
3.67
[3.46,3.89]
a,b > c 0.33
[.19, .48]
1.17
[1.04,1.29]
0.83
[.62,1.04]
SD 1.60 1.48 1.43
Re-experiencing M 4.37
[3.71,5.11]
4.87
[4.69,5.06]
3.06
[2.85,3.29]
a,b > c 0.29
[.12, .46]
1.11
[.97,1.25]
0.93
[.73,1.13]
SD 1.67 1.73 1.38
Spatial detail M 5.33
[4.56,6.50]
5.95
[5.81,6.10]
4.56
[4.31,4.80]
b > c 0.46
[.33, .60]
0.98
[.89,1.12]
0.50
[.28, .72]
SD 1.71 1.32 1.52
Speciﬁcity M 4.14
[3.30,5.00]
5.35
[5.17,5.54]
4.45
[4.17,4.78]
a,c < b 0.69
[.52, .87]
0.48
[.34, .65]
0.15
[.14, .44]
SD 2.01 1.73 2.02
Susceptibility to persuasion M 3.67
[2.84,4.42]
2.85
[2.67,3.03]
4.01
[3.76,4.26]
b < c 0.47
[.29, .64]
0.68
[.53, .83]
0.21
[.02, .44]
SD 1.83 1.76 1.60
Signiﬁcance M 3.95
[3.09,4.85]
4.63
[4.46,4.82]
3.64
[3.36,3.92]
b > c 0.37
[.20, .56]
0.56
[.40, .71]
0.18
[.08, .43]
SD 1.96 1.80 1.75
Rehearsal M 3.43
[2.68,4.17]
4.05
[3.87,4.22]
2.81
[2.62,3.03]
b > c 0.36
[.20, .54]
0.78
[.64, .92]
0.45
[.26, .65]
SD 1.71 1.70 1.33
Positive emotion M 2.86
[1.94,3.83]
3.54
[3.31,3.79]
2.82
[2.51,3.13]
b > c 0.30
[.08, .53]
0.33
[.15, .52]
0.02
[.26, .31]
SD 2.13 2.24 1.97
Negative emotion M 2.29
[1.48,3.15]
2.38
[2.18,2.59]
1.72
[1.50,1.95]
b > c 0.05
[.15, .24]
0.36
[.21, .52]
0.38
[.17, .60]
SD 1.98 1.98 1.42
Emotion intensity M 2.81
[1.92,3.72]
3.50
[3.30,3.72]
2.55
[2.29,2.81]
b > c 0.34
[.14, .54]
0.49
[.33, .66]
0.15
[.09, .40]
SD 2.04 2.04 1.66
General plausibility M 5.24
[4.39,6.07]
6.24
[6.05,6.44]
6.12
[5.80,6.44]
0.50
[.30, .70]
0.06
[.11, .23]
0.44
[.15, .73]
SD 2.10 1.99 1.99
Personal plausibility M 5.57
[4.78,6.38]
7.33
[7.20,7.46]
7.00
[6.72,7.24]
a < b,c 1.35
[1.22,1.48]
0.23
[.12, .36]
0.88
[.64,1.11]
SD 1.96 1.26 1.59
Note: Non-bel mem – nonbelieved memory; Bel mem – believed memory; Bel not rem – believed not remembered event. 95% conﬁdence intervals are in
brackets.
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4.1. Method
4.1.1. Participants
Lafayette College and University of Windsor undergraduate students (N = 236) took part for partial course credit (73.3%
female, Mage = 22.03, SD = 3.96, range 18–41).
4.1.2. Procedure
The procedures were identical to Study 1, with the exception that participants were randomized to recall either ﬁve
‘‘events’’ (N = 116) or ﬁve ‘‘memories’’ (N = 120). References to ‘‘events’’ in the cueing instructions from Study 1 were re-
placed with ‘‘memory’’ for approximately half of the participants (c.f., Appendix A). Reliability coefﬁcients for belief in occur-
rence (a = .81), recollection (a = .86), re-experiencing (a = .87), and rehearsal (a = .84) were all high.
4.2. Study 3 results
4.2.1. Episode types
Using the same criteria to deﬁne event subtypes as in Studies 1 and 2, we contrasted rates of nonbelieved memories, be-
lieved memories, and believed-not-remembered events between the groups (c.f., Table 1). As shown in Fig. 2, these distri-
butions were signiﬁcantly different, v2(2) = 15.05, p = .001, /c = .11. Most relevant, the event cue group produced a
signiﬁcantly greater number of nonbelieved memories (4.4% vs. 2.7%), v2(1) = 3.92, p = .048. The event cue group also pro-
vided more believed-not-remembered events (48.7% vs. 39.3%), and fewer believed memories (46.8% vs. 57.9%).
Fig. 2. Study 3, proportion of nonbelieved memories (darkest bars at the bottom), believed memories (lightest bars in the middle) and believed-not-
remembered events (bars at the top of each column) generated in response to Event and Memory cues. See the text for exact method of categorizing
autobiographical event representations.
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group by event subtype interactions, thus we collapsed across groups to contrast the subtypes (Table 4) as was done in Stud-
ies 1 and 2. We did not use an ANOVA framework in this context, because ANOVA is highly sensitive to large disparities in
cell size (Keppel, 1989). Nonbelieved and believed memories did not differ, and exceeded believed-not-remembered events,
for perceptual, re-experiencing, negative emotion, and emotion intensity. Nonbelieved memories were rated lower on spa-
tial, speciﬁcity, and personal plausibility, and higher on persuasion than believed memories. Believed memories exceeded
believed not-remembered events for most items, excepting positive emotion and general plausibility.
4.2.2. Group contrasts
We contrasted average item ratings and standard deviations between the cue groups (Table 5), collapsing across the ﬁve
events, using independent-samples t-tests, and by examining overlap in conﬁdence intervals (Cummings, 2011). The follow-
ing items had signiﬁcantly higher mean ratings in the memory-cue group: perceptual detail, re-experiencing, rehearsal, be-
lief in occurrence and recollection. The persuasion item was rated higher in the event-cue than the memory-cue group. The
remaining items did not differ by group. The average standard deviation across the belief in occurrence and recollection
items was signiﬁcantly greater for the event-cue group; between subjects t(234) = 2.51, p = .013, d = 0.30, 95% CI [.11, .54]
and t(234) = 2.31, p = .022, d = 0.30, 95% CI [.09, .51]. The event-cueing procedure resulted in signiﬁcantly greater variance
in belief in occurrence and recollection judgments than did the memory-cueing procedure.
4.2.3. Factor structure and predictors of belief in occurrence and recollection by group
Scoboria et al. (in press) found a stable factor structure for autobiographical belief and recollection across representation
types, indicating that the measurement of autobiographical belief and recollection is stable even when the relationships be-
tween the constructs differ. They also reported a double dissociation in the predictors of autobiographical belief and recol-
lection (recollection by perceptual, re-experiencing, emotion intensity, signiﬁcance; autobiographical belief by personal
plausibility). The next analyses involved testing whether these patterns depended on the cueing method. We anticipated
that the measurement structure would be stable, reﬂecting reliable measurement of autobiographical belief and recollection
across the two groups, but that the predictors would vary with perceptual features more predictive of recollection under the
memory cue, and plausibility more predictive of autobiographical belief under the event cue.
We conducted a series of structural equation models using IBM SPSS AMOS 21.0, using the Maximum Likelihood estima-
tion method. In the ﬁrst model, we tested the invariance of the factors across the event and memory cue groups, using the
AMOS 21.0 Multiple Groups procedure. The ﬁrst model involved loading the items onto their respective factors (two items on
the autobiographical belief latent variable, and three items on the recollection latent variable), and the second model added
the constraint of equivalence in the loadings across the event and memory cue groups. The unconstrained model was a good
ﬁt to the data [CFI = .998; RMSEA = .036(.00  .08)], and adding the constraint of group equivalence revealed model invari-
ance for loadings of indicators onto latent variables (DCFI = .001, meeting the criterion recommended by Cheung & Rensv-
old, 2002). The factor loadings for the items were: Autobiographical Belief: Belief, .72, Belief Strength, .95; Recollection:
Memory, .92, Memory Strength, .84, Remember/Know item .71.
Table 4
Study 3, memory characteristic ratings by autobiographical event representation.
Item Non-bel mem
n = 42
Bel mem
n = 618
Bel not rem
n = 520
Cohen’s d [95% CI]
(a) (b) (c) p < .001 (a) vs. (b) (b) vs. (c) (a) vs. (c)
Perceptual detail M 4.89
[4.44,5.33]
5.24
[5.12,5.36]
3.61
[3.49,3.73]
a,b > c 0.24
[.12, .35]
1.12
[1.03,1.21]
0.91
[.79,1.02]
SD 1.46 1.49 1.41
Re-experiencing M 4.40
[3.95,4.86]
4.84
[4.72,4.96]
3.18
[3.06,3.30]
a,b > c 0.29
[.17, .40]
1.12
[1.03,1.20]
0.86
[.74, .98]
SD 1.45 1.54 1.42
Spatial detail M 5.24
[4.83,5.65]
6.02
[5.92,6.12]
4.93
[4.79,5.07]
b > a,c 0.60
[.51, .71]
0.75
[.67, .84]
0.19
[.06, .33]
SD 1.32 1.28 1.63
Speciﬁcity M 4.69
[4.22,5.16]
5.41
[5.27,5.55]
4.61
[4.44,4.78]
b > a,c 0.41
[.28, .54]
0.42
[.32, .54]
0.04
[.12, .20]
SD 1.52 1.77 1.98
Susceptibility to persuasion M 4.17
[3.78,4.56]
3.06
[2.91,3.20]
4.08
[3.93,4.22]
b < a,c 0.72
[.50, .77]
0.59
[.48, .69]
0.05
[.08, .19]
SD 1.25 1.78 1.70
Signiﬁcance M 3.74
[3.22,4.26]
3.88
[3.73,4.03]
3.18
[3.02,3.34]
b > c 0.07
[.07, .22]
0.37
[.26, .48]
0.31
[.16, .46]
SD 1.67 1.91 1.84
Rehearsal M 3.67
[3.13,4.21]
3.84
[3.71,3.98]
3.09
[2.96,3.22]
b > c 0.10
[.03, .23]
0.47
[.38, .56]
0.38
[.25, .51]
SD 1.73 1.67 1.51
Positive emotion M 3.45
[2.78,4.12]
3.64
[3.46,3.82]
3.42
[3.23,3.60]
0.09
[.08, .25]
0.10
[.03, .23]
0.02
[.16, .19]
SD 2.15 2.23 2.13
Negative emotion M 2.62
[2.01,3.23]
1.99
[1.85,2.14]
1.66
[1.53,1.78]
a,b > c 0.34
[.20, .48]
0.21
[.10, .30]
0.65
[.53, .77]
SD 1.95 1.84 1.43
Emotion intensity M 3.24
[2.67,3.80]
2.75
[2.61,2.89]
2.19
[2.06,2.32]
a,b > c 0.27
[.14, .41]
0.34
[.24, .43]
0.68
[.56, .81]
SD 1.82 1.78 1.51
General plausibility M 5.26
[4.69,5.83]
6.11
[5.95,6.27]
6.25
[6.09,6.42]
a < c 0.44
[.27, .58]
0.07
[.04, .18]
0.53
[.37, .68]
SD 1.82 2.01 1.90
Personal plausibility M 5.76
[5.34,6.19]
7.36
[7.26,7.46]
7.21
[7.10,7.32]
a < b,c 1.21
[1.15,1.35]
0.11
[.04, .19]
1.10
[1.02,1.24]
SD 1.36 1.27 1.28
Note: Non-bel mem – nonbelieved memory; Bel mem – believed memory; Bel not rem – believed not remembered event. 95% conﬁdence intervals are in
brackets.
Table 5
Study 3, memory characteristic ratings by group.
Event cue Memory cue p Value Cohen’s d
M [95% CI] SD M [95% CI] SD (df = 234) [95% CI]
Perceptual detail 4.34 [4.17,4.50] 0.94 4.65 [4.46,4.83] 1.02 .013 0.32 [.19, .44]
Re-experiencing 3.88 [3.70,4.06] 1.10 4.31 [4.12,4.48] 1.15 .003 0.38 [.24, .53]
Spatial detail 5.45 [5.28,5.16] 0.95 5.58 [5.41,5.72] 0.85 .261 0.15 [.03, .26]
Speciﬁcity 4.94 [4.73,5.14] 1.12 5.12 [4.88,5.34] 1.23 .240 0.15 [.01, .30]
Susceptibility to persuasion 3.73 [3.53,3.94] 1.09 3.36 [3.14,3.58] 1.31 .017 0.31 [.15, .46]
Signiﬁcance 3.48 [3.28,3.68] 1.14 3.65 [3.42,3.86] 1.29 .429 0.14 [.02, .30]
Rehearsal 3.34 [3.16,3.52] 0.96 3.66 [3.44,3.88] 1.20 .028 0.29 [.16, .44]
Positive emotion 4.02 [3.78,4.25] 1.29 4.03 [3.78,4.27] 1.32 .934 0.01 [.17, .16]
Negative emotion 2.54 [2.33,2.75] 1.12 2.62 [2.41,2.83] 1.20 .682 0.05 [.08, .22]
Emotional intensity 3.49 [3.26,3.72] 1.30 3.47 [3.24,3.69] 1.28 .799 0.02 [.14, .18]
General plausibility 6.13 [5.89,6.36] 1.22 6.17 [5.93,6.40] 1.26 .863 0.03 [.13, .19]
Personal plausibility 7.19 [7.02,7.34] 0.91 7.30 [7.16,7.45] 0.89 .392 0.12 [.01, .24]
Belief in occurrence 6.92 [6.79,7.04] 0.68 7.15 [7.07,7.23] 0.44 .002 0.40 [.33, .48]
Recollection 5.20 [5.05,5.36] 0.88 5.59 [5.41,5.72] 0.87 .001 0.44 [.34, .56]
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Table 6
Study 3, item loadings for structural equation models predicting the autobiographical belief and recollection factors separately for the memory and event cue
groups.
Factor Predictor Model 2a event cue Model 2b memory cue
Estimate 95% CI p Estimate 95% CI p
Autobiographical belief Personal plausibility 0.66 [0.57,0.73] .002 0.46 [0.34,0.59] .002
Perceptual 0.01 [0.11,0.10] .940 0.07 [0.24,0.11] .514
Reexperiencing 0.06 [0.04,0.16] .280 0.08 [0.11,0.24] .474
Spatial 0.18 [0.07,0.28] .002 0.17 [0.02,0.30] .029
Speciﬁcity 0.10 [0.01,0.18] .023 0.13 [0.04,0.22] .010
Persuasion 0.08 [0.17,.01] .066 0.06 [0.18,0.04] .214
Recollection Personal plausibility 0.12 [0.06,0.18] .002 0.03 [0.03,0.09] .252
Perceptual 0.28 [0.18,0.38] .002 0.27 [0.18,0.38] .002
Reexperiencing 0.40 [0.30,0.51] .002 0.58 [0.48,0.66] .002
Spatial 0.19 [0.12,0.26] .002 0.10 [0.02,0.17] .015
Speciﬁcity 0.09 [0.02,0.16] .012 0.10 [0.04,0.16] .003
Persuasion 0.14 [0.21,0.08] .002 0.09 [0.14,0.03] .002
Note: These standardized path coefﬁcients resulted when predicting the two latent factors (autobiographical belief, recollection) simultaneously within the
same model. Separate models were conducted for each group (memory cue, event cue) because the initial model indicated that while the factor loadings
were invariant, the pathways for the predictors were not.
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susceptibility to persuasion3); all predictors were allowed to correlate. As expected, a test of the unconstrained model against
a model in which the path coefﬁcients were constrained to be equal across groups failed to showmodel invariance (DCFI = .017).
This indicates that the relationships between the predictors and the factors varied by group.We ran separate SEMmodels for each
group; the standardized path coefﬁcients are provided in Table 6. The key differences between groupswere: (1) while plausibility
wasstronglyassociatedwithautobiographical belief inbothmodels, the relationshipwasstronger in the ‘event’ group; (2) re-expe-
riencing predicted recollection to a greater extent in the ‘memory’ group; and (3) plausibility predicted recollection only in the
‘event’ group. Consistent across the groups were that perceptual details, re-experiencing, speciﬁcity and susceptibility to persua-
sion (negatively) predicted recollection, whereas personal plausibility and spatial detail predicted autobiographical belief.
We calculated the variance explained in each of the factors by these predictors for each group. In the memory cue group,
69% (90% CI [.60, .79]) of the variance in recollection and 44% (90% CI [.32, .59]) of the variance in autobiographical belief was
predicted. In the event cue group, 65% (90% CI [.57, .74]) of the variance in recollection and 68% (90% CI [.58, .79]) of the var-
iance in belief was predicted. Autobiographical belief was not as well predicted in the ‘memory’ group. The greater prediction
of autobiographical belief in the ‘event’ group was due to stronger inﬂuence of personal plausibility. When recollection was
strong, plausibility showed a weaker inﬂuence on autobiographical belief. Finally, when the cue emphasized ‘events’ features
associated with autobiographical belief showed a weak but signiﬁcant relationship with recollection.
4.3. Discussion
Study 3 provides evidence for a recollection bias with ‘‘memory’’ cues. We found greater overlap amongst features asso-
ciated with recollection in events generated in response to ‘‘memory’’ cues. Seemingly small changes in language resulted in
differences in the frequency of event representations that resulted. This is consistent with long-standing arguments about
the effects of the retrieval environment on memory output (Tulving & Thomson, 1973). ‘Event’ cues produced more nonbe-
lieved memories and believed-not-remembered events compared to ‘memory’ cues, and inﬂuenced greater variability in
autobiographical belief and recollection ratings. Perceptual detail and re-experiencing uniquely predicted recollection across
both groups, and perceptual detail explained more variance in recollection in the ‘memory’ group. Plausibility predicted be-
lief in occurrence in both groups, and was weakly associated with recollection only in the ‘event’ group. Quite simply, one
ﬁnds different autobiographical experiences depending on how one asks.
5. General discussion
We raised a number of questions in the introduction that the current series of studies have addressed. We found that non-
believed memories and believed-not-remembered events can be elicited in the absence of deliberate cueing. However, the
number of nonbelieved memories produced was not large. This strikes us as not particularly surprising, as believed autobio-
graphical representations form a preponderance of self-relevant event representations. The 20% nonbelieved memory rate
reported by Mazzoni et al. (2010) is notably higher than the 3%–6.4% rates observed here. This difference in accessibility
may be due to a bias toward reporting believed events under typical testing conditions. Participants may assume that3 Preliminary analyses revealed that the remaining items (emotion items, rehearsal items, and the signiﬁcance item) did not predict either factor, and these
were excluded from the ﬁnal models.
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sible that once the truth status for a believed memory is reduced, that the event becomes less accessible, all other event char-
acteristics being equal. One test would be to cue individuals who are known to have nonbelieved memories, and see if such
events emerge when indirectly assessed.
While memory representations are frequently updated (reconstructed) due to the acquisition of new information, salient
nonbelieved memories occur when new information is sufﬁciently discrepant with a memory to produce cognitive disso-
nance, and additional processing is required to make a decision about the belief status of the memory (Scoboria et al., in
press). The nonbelieved memories studied to date are those for which the challenging of the memory representation is
remembered along with the prior memory representation. Presumably many reattributions of memories as non-memories
are less important and occur heuristically, without awareness that the status of the event has changed (see, Johnson, Hash-
troudi, & Lindsay, 1993, for a discussion of heuristic vs. systematic processing). Hence, it is not surprising that nonbelieved
memories do not manifest readily when cued, and new experimental procedures will be needed to access such processes
indirectly. We look forward to work that identiﬁes what we assume to be a distinct type of nonbelieved memories, those
which are forgotten relatively soon after autobiographical belief is withdrawn.
Nonbelieved memories were deﬁned in this study as any instance in which respondents chose to rate recollection higher
than belief by one point or more, provided that both ratings were also not highly rated on each scale. For the majority of
nonbelieved memories, the difference was near one point on the scale. These studies show that a one point difference does
matter – when people choose to rate recollection higher than autobiographical belief, they are doing so based on distinct
phenomenology. This observation is supported by data from Scoboria et al. (in press, Study 2) who directly asked for salient
nonbelieved memories and found that recollection exceeded belief by 1.4 points on average. Perhaps it is the decision to rate
recollection higher than belief at all that matters. Future research might develop indirect cueing methods which can overs-
ample instances in which belief is rated lower than recollection and for which recollection ratings more substantially exceed
autobiographical belief ratings, in order to address such questions. Furthermore, we draw attention to the fact that autobio-
graphical belief for the nonbelieved memories is moderate, particularly when contrasted to the believed-not-remembered
category. This ﬁnding is consistent with Scoboria et al. (in press), and suggests that nonbelieved memories are characterized
by autobiographical belief that is substantially attenuated, but not completely undermined.
These studies indicate that the distribution of the types of representation varies depending on the age of the event and on
how events are cued. More believed-not-remembered events are generated when cues are directed at younger ages. This is
consistent with prior evidence from the developmental psychology literature on infantile amnesia which shows a transition
from ‘‘knowing’’ that events occurred to ‘‘remembering’’ events at around 4½ years of age (Bruce et al., 2000). This may re-
ﬂect the emergence of recollective autobiographical event representations. Prior to this age, knowledge about autobiograph-
ical events is due to presumed reliance on secondary sources for autobiographical event knowledge (e.g., family stories,
photographs and videos, etc.). Nonbelieved memories were more likely to occur when cueing in age ranges between 6
and 11 years old. Mazzoni et al. (2010) reported that their participants’ nonbelieved memories were, on average, from mid-
dle childhood, and the average age when that belief was challenged and withdrawn was early adolescence. Based on this
ﬁnding, future studies should explicitly cue this age range. Future work that examines the dating of nonbelieved memories
by individuals of varying age would be useful for conﬁrming whether nonbelieved memories are reliably associated with
middle childhood to early adolescence or if the relationship between belief and recollection (and predictors of each) are
the same during these developmental time points as during adulthood.
Key aspects of the phenomenological and metacognitive ratings associated with the nonbelieved memories matched
those reported by Mazzoni et al. (2010). Perceptual detail and re-experiencing were consistently associated with events the-
oretically high in recollective quality (believed and nonbelieved memories). Convergent ﬁndings have been reported in stud-
ies of experimentally created nonbelieved memories (Clark et al., 2012; Otgaar et al., 2013). This is in alignment with the
body of work that has associated perceptual imagery and re-experiencing with autobiographical remembering (Brewer,
1996; Johnson et al., 1993; Rubin et al., 2003; Tulving, 1983). This and other work on nonbelieved memories shows that this
association holds even in the absence of autobiographical belief. Other items (spatial/contextual detail and emotional inten-
sity) associated with both believed and nonbelieved memories in Mazzoni et al. (2010) were not reliably associated with the
nonbelieved memories elicited in these studies. This suggests that the approach used to elicit events matters for some fea-
tures associated with remembering but not for others.
Other variables differentiated believed from nonbelieved memories. Nonbelieved memories were consistently rated as
less personally plausible and more susceptible to persuasion. Personal plausibility is a rating that an event could have oc-
curred, and reﬂects the assessment of the ontological status of the event (‘‘could this event have existed in my past?’’). Hence
the current nonbelieved memories reﬂect cases in which recollection is strong but the reality status of the event is under-
mined. It is not clear in this work if the association of nonbelieved memories with persuasion is due to innate characteristics
of the mental representation, or if these events have been subject to challenge via social feedback. Social feedback is the most
frequently reported reason for relinquishing belief in one’s memory (Mazzoni et al., 2010), and more generally, people fre-
quently report seeking input from others when verifying events (Wade & Garry, 2005).
Belief in the occurrence of autobiographical events is a default state with regard to one’s own memories (Conway, 1997;
Gilbert, 1991) and is often based on the coherence of the overall memory and the amount of perceptual detail (Ross, Buehler,
& Karr, 1998). Individuals who report reduced conﬁdence in the accuracy of memory for events cite (in order of frequency)
lack of social veriﬁcation, lack of visual detail, and implausibility as reasons why they experienced uncertainty (Arbuthnott,
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qualities decreases (see Scoboria et al., 2012, for more on plausibility). One explanation for this is that autobiographical belief
is likely inferred when recollection is strong (Scoboria et al., 2004).
The third study demonstrated that cueing for ‘‘events’’ leads to different conclusions about autobiographical belief and
recollection compared to cueing for ‘‘memories’’. Cueing for memories resulted in ratings that approached the scale ceiling
and which showed less variability perhaps due to ceiling effects. Cueing for ‘memories’ therefore makes observing the dis-
tinction between these constructs more difﬁcult. This leads to the conclusion that cueing for memories results in a narrower,
more homogenous set of representations, while cueing for events obtains a broader, more heterogeneous sample of autobio-
graphical representations. Which approach is used should depend on the research questions. If focusing on distinguishing
between autobiographical belief and recollection, the ‘event’ cue is more appropriate as it facilitates greater variability in
ratings. These ﬁndings are consistent with the more general argument that how one asks for events, and who does the ask-
ing, informs the reports received (Hyman, 1994). The method used to elicit events has implications for the conclusions that
one makes about the nature and components of remembering. It is also unclear how these characteristics may differ among
speciﬁc event memories (e.g., attending Sally’s 21st birthday party), general memories that merge many instances of the
same nature (e.g., going to parades), and memories of extended periods (e.g., spending a semester abroad). Our instructions
emphasized the recall of speciﬁc events. The paucity of information provided by participants in response to each prompt in
the current design (i.e., 3–4 word descriptions) prevents a detailed analysis of how well participants followed that instruc-
tion. Future research is needed to examine more precisely the role of autobiographical belief and recollection among these
types of autobiographical representations.
Some researchers may wonder how the autobiographical recollection/autobiographical belief distinction might relate to
the so-called remember/know distinction. While the ideas of ‘recollection’ and ‘remember’ are substantially similar, ‘auto-
biographical belief’ and ‘know’ are not the same. The remember/know distinction was proposed by Tulving (1983) to reﬂect
that some memory reports are based in episodic awareness whereas other reports are not. There is considerable debate as to
the nature of the distinction, a review of which is beyond the scope of this paper. The debate has spanned issues as to
whether the remember and know states are distinct or overlapping (Gardiner, 2001), and whether the processes involved
in basic memory studies with word lists are the same as those that are involved in the evaluation of autobiographical mem-
ories (Fitzgerald & Broadbridge, 2012; Wilkinson & Hyman, 1998).
Our position is that most conceptualizations of ‘remember’ and ‘know’ describe processes that could each contribute to
autobiographical belief judgments as deﬁned here. Autobiographical belief is the judgment that an event truly occurred. It is
an overarching, summative appraisal that is based on all information available at the time the judgment is made. Autobio-
graphical belief is not the absence of recollection; autobiographical belief judgments are made in the presence of strong,
moderate, weak, or no recollection. While recollection is a powerful inﬂuence when present, autobiographical belief may
be based partly or wholly on other sources of information and processes. Examples of other inﬂuences include, but are
not limited to, social inﬂuence (e.g., pressure to remember or to forget); the plausibility of events (e.g., available evidence
to support/refute the possibility of occurrence); and cognitive experience while ‘remembering’ (e.g., attribution of processing
ﬂuency as indicating memory).
The remember/know (R/K) task frequently used in studies of memory should also not be confused with the measurement
of autobiographical belief or recollection. In studies that use the R/K procedure, when individuals indicate that an item was
presented before, they are asked to judge whether they remember the item, or know that it was presented without remem-
bering. Translating this to the current work, the autobiographical belief rating is the initial decision that the item was pre-
sented (see Scoboria et al., in press, for further discussion), and not some subsequent judgment made to report the origin(s)
of the judgment. This research and Scoboria et. al. (in press) indicate that in the context of recalling autobiographical events,
self-report items that query remembering vs. knowing are excellent indicators of recollection.
Our point indiscussing remember/know in this paper is to emphasize that our approach is substantially distinct. Some readers
might assume that the distinction between autobiographical belief and recollection parallels the R/K distinction,which is not the
case.Wetakenopositionhereon the relevanceof remember/knowjudgmentsas implemented insingle item(e.g.,word list) stud-
ieswithin thedomainof autobiographicalmemory.We refer the reader toMcCabe, Geraci, Bowman, Sensenig, andRhodes (2011)
and Fitzgerald and Broadbridge (2012) for further discussion of the use of R/K judgments in autobiographical memory.
Finally, we observe that the current work is consistent with Brewer’s (1996) deﬁnition of autobiographical remembering
as comprised of multiple metamemorial components. Of speciﬁc interest, he mentions: (1) a memory image (recollection);
(2) belief that the event occurred in the past (autobiographical belief); and (3) conﬁdence that the details recalled accurately
represent what occurred (termed ‘belief in recollection’ in Scoboria et al., in press). The current studies emphasize the ﬁrst
and second components, and do not at all address the third. The Basic Systems Model (Rubin, 2006) emphasizes the ﬁrst and
third components, and several studies point to the potential validity of that distinction (Fitzgerald & Broadbridge, 2012; Ru-
bin et al., 2003). Future research is needed that simultaneously examines the relatedness of all three components.
In summary, these studies show a more complete picture of autobiographical remembering than is typically examined.
Just as the study of autobiographical memory has enriched our understanding of basic memory, so too does the careful
examination of how memories are brought to mind and what the component processes are when recalling the past. We can-
not afford to take one exemplar of memory and mistake it for all memories. We look forward to future research in which
further study of less typically studied autobiographical event representations leads to novel understanding of the compo-
nents and functions of remembering personally-experienced past events.
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Appendix A
Event cue instructions (All studies)
Next you will be asked to think of a number of EVENTS from your childhood, from before the age of 6. By ‘‘Event’’ we mean
any story or scene that occurred at a particular time and in a speciﬁc place. Events usually last for minutes or hours and no
more than a single day.
A box will appear where you must type a 2–3 word description of this event, which need be intelligible only to you, that is
speciﬁc enough to remind you of that unique event at a later time. All of the events should be different. Please do not record
any proper names (for people or places) or other information that would let us know who you are – use an initial if
necessary.
We would like you to record the ﬁrst event that comes to mind for each prompt. The event may or may not have been
signiﬁcant to you.
You also may or may not have thought much about the event since it happened, it does not matter. You may or may not
have discussed the event with other people. For example, an event might be a family story that involves you.
We are interested in any and all personally-experienced events.
Please select a different event for each prompt.
Memory cue instructions (Study 3)
Next you will be asked to think of a number of MEMORIES from before the age of 6. By ‘‘memory’’ we mean any story or
scene you remember from your personal past that occurred at a particular time and in a speciﬁc place.
A box will appear where you must type a 2–3 word description of this memory, which need be intelligible only to you,
that is speciﬁc enough to remind you of that unique memory at a later time. All of the memories should be different. Please
do not record any proper names (for people or places) or other information that would let us know who you are – use an
initial if necessary.
We would like you to record the ﬁrst memory that comes to mind for each prompt. The memory may or may not have
been signiﬁcant to you.
You also may or may not have thought much about the memory since it happened, it does not matter. You may or may
not have discussed the memory with other people. For example, a memory might be of a one-time-only event you haven’t
remembered since it happened.
We are interested in any and all personally-experienced memories.
Please select a different event for each prompt.
Appendix B
Belief in Occurrence items
1. How likely is it that you personally did in fact experience this event?
1 Deﬁnitely did not happen; 8 Deﬁnitely happened
2. How strong is your belief that this event actually occurred (whether or not you remember the event)?
1 No belief, 3 Weak belief, 5 Moderate belief, 7 Strong belief
Recollection items
3. Do you actually remember experiencing this event?
1 No memory of event at all, 8 Clear and complete memory of event
4. How strong is your memory for this event (whether or not you believe the event occurred)?
1 No memory, 3 Weak memory, 5 Moderate memory, 7 Strong memory
5. Sometimes people know something happened to them without being able to actually remember it. As I think about
the event, I can actually remember it rather than just knowing that it happened.
1 Not at all, 3 Vaguely, 5 Distinctly, 7 As much as any memory
Predictors
Perceptual detail
6. As I think about the event, I can see, hear, or otherwise perceive in my mind what happened.
1 Not at all, 3 Vaguely, 5 Distinctly, 7 As clearly as if it were happening now
Re-experiencing
7. While thinking about this event, I feel as though I am reliving it.
(continued on next page)
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8. While thinking about this event, I feel that I travel back to the time when it happened.
1 Not at all, 3 Vaguely, 5 Distinctly, 7 Completely
Spatial detail
9. While thinking about this event, I know the setting where it occurred
1 Not at all, 3 Vaguely, 5 Distinctly, 7 As clearly as if it were happening now
Speciﬁcity
10. This event is based on details speciﬁc to my life, not on general knowledge that I would expect most people to have
1 Not at all, 3 In some details, 5 In some main points, 7 Completely
Susceptibility to persuasion
11. If another witness to the event, who you generally trusted, existed and told you a very different account of the event,
to what extent could you be persuaded that your version of the event was wrong?
1 Not at all, 3 In some details, 5 In some main points, 7 Completely
Signiﬁcance
12. This event is signiﬁcant to my life because it imparts an important message for me or represents an anchor, critical
juncture, or turning point.
1 Not at all, 3 Vaguely, 5 Distinctly, 7 More than any other event
Rehearsal items
13. Since it happened, I have thought about this event.
1 Not at all, 3 Vaguely, 5 Distinctly, 7 More than any other event
14. Since it happened, I have talked about this event.
1 Not at all, 3 Vaguely, 5 Distinctly, 7 More than any other event
Emotion items
15. While thinking about this event, the emotions that I feel are
1 Neutral, 3 Somewhat pleasant, 5 Pleasant, 7 Extremely pleasant
16. While thinking about this event, the emotions that I feel are
1 Neutral, 3 Somewhat unpleasant, 5 Unpleasant, 7 Extremely unpleasant
17. While thinking about this event, the emotions that I feel are intense.
1 Not at all, 3 Hardly, 5 Somewhat, 7 Extremely intense
General plausibility
18. How plausible is it that at least some people could have experienced this event?
1 Not at all plausible; 8 Extremely plausible
Personal plausibility
19. How plausible is it that you personally could have experienced this event?
1 Not at all plausible; 8 Extremely plausibleReferences
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